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STATE REGULATIONS IN GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT: THEY BARK 
BUT DO THEY BITE? 
 
LA REGULATION DES EAUX SOUTERRAINES PAR L'ETAT : DES 








Because of the logics of both colonization or de-colonization, the need to counter the anarchy of groundwater use, or the 
dissemination of global 'best practices' of IWRM, states have often assumed full ownership or custody of groundwater. 
Regulating groundwater use includes giving drilling and abstraction authorizations/licenses, establishing an inventory of 
wells and reducing use in existing wells. Although laws and regulations look neat and straightforward on paper, 
registration, regularization, and metering have been bedeviled by a host of logistical nightmares, policy contradictions, 
legal challenges, and vested private interests. The overall outlook is bleak and questions the overstating of state power in 
reordering groundwater use. Co-management with users, while in itself not sufficient to ensure success, often arises as a 
possible way out of the failure of state control. 
RÉSUMÉ 
A cause des logiques et des objectifs propres à la fois à la colonisation et à la décolonisation, ou du besoin de combattre 
l'anarchie de l'usage des eaux souterraines, ou de l'influence des bonnes pratiques globales associées à la gestion 
intégrée des ressources en eau, les états ont souvent affirmé leur rôle de propriétaire ou de gardien des eaux 
souterraines. La régulation de cette ressource comprend en particulier les autorisations/licenses pour le forage de puits et 
l'utilisation de l'eau, la mise en place d'inventaires de puits, et la réduction des volumes pompés par les puits existants. 
Bien que les lois et les régulations semblent, sur le papier, adaptées et rationnelles, la régularisation, l'enregistrement, et 
la pose de compteurs au niveau des puits se sont heurtés à un éventail de cauchemars logistiques, de contradictions en 
termes de politiques publiques, de contestations légales, et d'intérêts privés. Le bilan global est décourageant et pose la 
question de la surestimation du pouvoir de l'État à réguler le secteur. Une cogestion avec les usagers, bien qu'en soi-
même pas suffisante pour assurer une gestion durable, apparaît souvent comme une alternative à l'échec d'une régulation 
par les seuls états. 
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1. Introduction 
The 'control' of groundwater use, understood here as the intent to keep abstraction in line with the potential of the aquifer 
(we do not directly address here issues of groundwater contamination), is one of the most vexing issues in water 
management. Because it is hard to control the expansion and the magnitude of such a diffuse use of an invisible resource, 
often involving a large number of users and unclear water rights, the state has commonly ended up asserting its control 
over this resource. This had also been the case with colonial powers (e.g., in eastern or western Africa) which attempted 
to dispossess local users to the benefits of colons, or after de-colonization, when newly-independent states reasserted 
control over the nation's resources. More generally, conventional IWRM 'best-practices' have also promoted "enabling 
environments [that] include establishing government as the “owner” of all water resources and a selected ministry as a 
water resources management authority and regulatory agency" (Cap-Net, 2010). Even in legal contexts, such as the 
Anglo-Saxon Common Law (e.g. UK, eastern US, Australia), where private rights are in general attached to land 
ownership, the state has in general been gradually led to impose rules of 'reasonable use', 'correlative rights' (reduced 
proportionally in case of shortage), or the definition of quantitative 'desired future conditions' that effectively restrict use 
(Texas). Our focus here is on countries where the state is the "owner" of the resource or its "custodian" (it manages it in 
the name of the people) and assumes full responsibility for its management. 
The importance of groundwater resources for domestic water supply and industries, but also in some places for 
agriculture, on the one hand, and the widespread negative impacts of their dramatic overexploitation on the other, have 
led governments to implement a panoply of measures and regulations. Policy objectives, wherever the resource is 
overexploited, typically include 1) preventing the drilling of new wells and therefore the increase in the depletion of the 
aquifer, 2) controlling or reducing the water abstracted by existing wells, 3) increasing supply through water transfers 
and/or recharge (artificial or water harvesting) (Figure 1). We limit ourselves here to the first two policy objectives. 
Figure 1: Main groundwater policy objectives (and local adaptation – inner circle) 
 
2. Establishing a licensing/water right system 
Any kind of state-centered groundwater management obviously begins with knowing who is abstracting how much, where 
and for what, prompting inventories, registration campaigns, authorizing and licensing of wells. State regulations are often 
quite demanding and distinguish between drilling authorizations and use/exploitation licenses. Requesters must provide 
information on depth, intended use and volumes, maps of well location (drawn by a certified engineer), drilling technique 
used, etc., and must pay fees. The request has to go through several administrations/ministries, requires field visits and 
checks, and sometimes is published in public places to allow for possible contestation. Licensing wells means that 
bureaucratic processes must also be established for requests of well deepening, cleaning, or replacement (well clogged 
up or dried up). More crucially it also means that existing uses must be regularized, including both legal (declared) and 
illegal wells. In general well owners are given a certain time (typically from 3 months to 3 years) to declare their wells but 
the expectation that people are ready to comply is always proved wrong. Reluctance comes from various reasons, 
including the fear to be taxed or see one's use restricted, the fees to be paid, the imposition of a water meter, or the 
contestation of state ownership and intrusion. As a result, registration process are lengthy, partial, and give way to 
renewed and successive deadlines fraught with false declarations, corruption, litigation… and what turns out to be a 
logistical nightmare. In Spain, the 1985-1988 regularization period was extended until 2001 but only 17,000 out of the 
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River Basin Authority in 2008 (Martinez-Santos et al. ). In South-Africa regularization period started in 1998 but only 20% 
of applications had been processed in 2012, with permits distributed in only two basins. In Morocco, a regularization 
period for wells dug before 1995 was open in 1998; in 2009, wells dug until 2009 could be registered within 3 years, a 
period later extended to 2015. The total of existing wells is unknown, but there are more unregistered wells than registered 
ones. In the south of France, in the Roussillon Aquifer, only 10-20% of the wells are officially registered (Montginoul and 
Rinaudeau 2009). 
Registration and licensing processes are bedeviled by the cost and time needed to process files, by the lack of capacity to 
check reality on the ground, by the lack of budget and staff of agencies, by political pressures and the capacity of 
influential people to circumvent the rules and get authorizations, by the lack of knowledge of the hydrology, which 
invariably results in the over-allocation of rights. This applies to both surface and groundwater rights/licenses, and to 
countries as diverse as US, Australia, South Africa, Mexico or Spain. All this speaks to the incapacity of the state to 
effectively monitor and control what happens on the ground.  
It is all too common to hear officials saying "in our country we have all the best laws and regulation, but the problem is 
implementation and enforcement". The implicit suggestion is that it is costly and strenuous to apply regulations (and that 
with more means, funding and capacity building this could be possible). But there are also recurrent mentions of the 
infamous "lack of political will", which is a shorthand for the antagonistic private interests of those in power. First it is often 
the case that high-ranking government officials and political leaders applying or voting regulations are the first 
beneficiaries of the groundwater industry. Nowhere is this clearer than in Yemen, where sheikhs and landlords command 
considerable power in the Parliament and the government. It has been reported (Alhamdi 2012) that on the very day some 
regulations were passed to ban wells in the Sanaa basin, the minister of interior was drilling an illegal well in his property… 
In Jordan or Morocco too, investors in the groundwater-based agriculture are often powerful figures or corporations, 
sometimes close to the King.  
Second, controlling wells and/or abstraction potentially means affecting the livelihoods of numerous and often poor 
peasants, which is politically unpalatable. Politicians have therefore consistently preferred to sweep the problem under the 
carpet rather than addressing it before the next election. The fate of smallholder agriculture is however often raised as a 
convenient justification to continued lax enforcement and/or low taxation. In practice, in the long run the status quo 
benefits users who are able to drill deeper (and illegal) wells and extract water at a higher cost, and gradually displace 
those who cannot. It usually takes the convergence of a crisis (e.g. California these past years) and strong leadership (e.g. 
Jordan at present) to enhance enforcement. 
Controlling wells may also include buying them back (where licenses/rights have been over-allocated) or cracking down on 
illegal wells. The Spanish case shows that making sure that decommissioned wells are not used is hard and would require 
them to be back-filled. This is what mandate many laws, which specify that this should be done at the expense of the 
violators, but in practice such a drastic measure is extremely rare. Jordan claims to have recently back-filled several 
hundred illegal wells but those wells were actually unused. A productive plantation that would have to be abandoned after 
the well has been destroyed by the state is yet to be seen. 
3. Reducing groundwater abstraction 
Reducing abstraction in existing wells is the next uphill battle. It is important to understand that little can be done on that 
front if the number of wells is not first put under control. It is indeed very hard to obtain reduction in abstraction levels by, 
say 0-30%, but it is illusory to imagine achieving this if one user from whom this effort is demanded has a neighbor who is 
drilling new illegal wells at the same time. Reducing use means that there is some benchmark against which a reduction 
will be envisaged. This means that enforcement has to go through quantitative estimates of water use, which can be made 
through metering or indirect estimates of consumption through energy consumption or area irrigated (+ crop type and 
irrigation technology). Groundwater metering has been promoted as a 'best practice' despite the fact that it seldom works 
on the ground, at least when associated with a sheer constraint. If pricing or another kind of negative incentive starts to 
'bite', meters are invariably found broken, by-passed, or tampered with in increasing numbers, field staff corrupted and 
self-reporting distorted. In Jordan, one of the countries with a long history of groundwater policies, recent field surveys and 
studies through remote sensing have shown that actual water use was anywhere between 2 and 3 times the official 
amount, itself already much higher than what is considered as the recharge. Sanctions also become hard to apply, 
especially when they have been made excessively harsh to the point they have become un-credible. 
Positive incentives to reducing water use include the use of subsidies distributed to those who respect fixed quotas, 
change cropping patterns, adopt micro-irrigation or discontinue cultivation (for one season or permanently). This may work 
(e.g. Spain) when subsidies more than offset corresponding financial losses but is hard to sustain because of the outlays 
of public or European funds needed. Micro-irrigation hardly reduces evapotranspiration (water depletion), and sometimes 
even increases it. Its net impact on the aquifer is often neutral, or even negative, when the efficiency gains are used to 
expand cultivation (this is common in arid areas where land is available). 
Other indirect means may be more effective. Controlling (rationing) electricity supply, like in Gujarat, India, is attractive but 
this requires a dedicated grid parallel to the domestic one, which is uncommon and costly. It is also possible to promote 
crops that are less water-intensive through various input and output factor subsidies and taxes. But market logics integrate 
all production factors and what is gained on one side is often lost on others. On balance, although attention to policy 
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contradictions is warranted no silver bullet has been found that would drastically reduce water use, everything else being 
equal. 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
For strategic and other reasons states have often assumed total power over groundwater resources. Confronted with 
deviant individual behaviours that threaten the sustainability and quality of groundwater, their first, and often knee-jerk 
reaction, is to enact strict regulations and/or to stiffen the (theoretical) punishments defined for each type of violation. Just 
like wider public goods such as security, the state counts on the dissuasive power of sanctions and on its perceived 
authority to enforce its regulation. Regulations address the conditions under which drilling rigs can be owned and used, 
wells can be dug or drilled, and water can be abstracted. Although all these approaches are in general sound and 
straightforward on paper, they are, in practice, bedeviled by a number of practical, logistical, financial and political 
difficulties. There is a need to acknowledge that the capacity of the state to control and reorder the use of groundwater is 
overstated, which speaks to both its ability to deploy regulatory power on the ground (with often unexpected logistical 
nightmares) and its willingness to do so ('state-of-the-art policies' often remaining 'without teeth' because they go against 
the vested financial and political interests of people with influence or in power). This echoes Elinor Ostrom’s (2000) 
warning that ‘‘the worst of all worlds may be one where external authorities impose rules but are only able to achieve weak 
monitoring and sanctioning’’. The severity of the sanctions to violations is often proportional to the helplessness of the 
state in front of the problem it wants to solve. But raising this severity to non-credible levels actually further undermines the 
efficacy of the regulations. It also has the unintended effect of raising the level of bribing, since the money given to evade 
or avoid a threat can now be increased proportionally to that threat. 
Although groundwater rights/licenses seem, at face value, to be easier to establish and control than surface water (the 
points of use and users are potentially easier to identify), this assumption proves to be wrong. Yet, the pervasiveness of 
the licensing approach, narrowly associated with state ownership or custodianship of groundwater as well as with the 
conventional framework's of IWRM and water governance conceptions, clearly pertain to the ‘‘instrumental myth [which] 
assumes that the intended changes in water management can be made only by formulating and legislating official rules’’ 
(Boelens et al. 2002). Even in India, by far the world leader in terms of number of wells, and a political economy which has 
produced free-electricity policies for rural areas rather than strict regulations, most states officially embraced licensing 
policies. 
But reforms and regulations do not only fail. They severely dent the trust between citizens and state agencies and expose 
the weakness of the state. Strong declarations and regulations are undermined by shifting deadlines and the evidence to 
all that nothing happens when wells are not regularized or new illegal wells are dug. As Thomas and Grindle (1990) have 
observed, ‘‘reforms have been attempted when the administrative or political resources to implement them did not exist. 
The result has generally been misallocated resources, wasted political capital, and frustration’’. Although well inventories 
and quantitative regulation of use are probably necessary, it is all too clear that they are not sufficient. A review of 
groundwater management in the world shows that state-only management of groundwater is unlikely to succeed. Whether 
out of necessity or conviction, a degree of co-management with users appears to be also necessary. This will increase the 
likelihood of success but it is rare that substantial changes can be achieved without a combination of crisis situation (e.g. 
severe drought) and political leadership. 
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